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European Central Bank working paper series 30Abstract
This paper o¤ers an alternative explanation for the behavior of postwar US in‡ation by
measuring a novel source of monetary policy time-inconsistency due to Cukierman (2002).
In the presence of asymmetric preferences, the monetary authorities end up generating a
systematic in‡ation bias through the private sector expectations of a larger policy response
in recessions than in booms. Reduced-form estimates of US monetary policy rules indicate
that while the in‡ation target declines from the pre- to the post-Volcker regime, the average
in‡ation bias, which is about one percent before 1979, tends to disappear over the last two
decades. This result can be rationalized in terms of the preference on output stabilization,
which is found to be large and asymmetric in the former but not in the latter period.
JEL Classi…cation: E52, E58
Keywords: asymmetric preferences, time-inconsistency, average in‡ation bias, US in‡ation
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The behavior of postwar US inflation is characterized by two major episodes. The first is an
initial rise that extends from the 1960s through the early 1980s. The second is a subsequent fall
that lasts from the early 1980s to the present day. The difference of the average inflation rates
across the two sub-samples is above 2%. While a more favorable macroeconomic environment,
a better policy management or a persistent error in the real-time measures of potential output are
also likely to have played a role, an important strand of the literature has investigated whether
the time-consistency problem can explain the behavior of US inflation.
In a stimulating contribution, Ireland (1999) shows that Barro and Gordon’s (1983) model
of time-consistent monetary policy imposes long-run restrictions on the time series properties of
inflation and unemployment that are not rejected by the data. In the absence of a commitment
technology, the monetary authorities face an incentive to surprise inflation in an effort to
achieve a lower level of unemployment through an expectations-augmented Phillips curve.
However, such an optimal plan is not time-consistent in the sense of Kydland and Prescott
(1977), and private agents, who rationally understand such a temptation, adjust their decisions
accordingly. In equilibrium, unemployment is still at its first-best level but the rate of inflation is
inefficiently higher than it would otherwise be. This is the celebrated inflation bias result,
according to which the higher the natural rate of unemployment the more severe the time-
consistency problem of monetary policy is.
As Persson and Tabellini (1999) make clear, the central bankers’ ambition of attaining a
level of unemployment below the natural rate is crucial to generate the kind of inflation bias a la
Barro and Gordon (1983), and both researchers and policy makers have challenged such an
assumption on the ground of realism. McCallum (1997) argues that were this the case, the
monetary authorities would learn by practising the time-inconsistency of their actions and
eventually would revise their objective. Describing his experience as vice-Chairman, Blinder
(1998) claims that the Fed actually targets the natural rate of real activity, thereby suggesting
that overambitious policy makers cannot be at the root of any kind of inflation bias. While this
may rationalize the failure of the theory to account for the short-run inflation dynamics (see
Ireland, 1999), it does not necessarily imply that the time-consistency problem has been
unimportant in the recent history of US monetary policy.
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preferences that nests the Barro-Gordon model as a special case. When applied to the full
postwar period, the hypothesis that the Fed targets a level of real activity different from the
natural rate is rejected but the hypothesis that it weights more severely output contractions than
output expansions is not. This suggests the existence of a novel average inflation bias that
according to Cukierman (2002) comes from the private sector expectations of a more vigorous
policy response in recessions than in booms.
The novel average inflation bias is a function of both the preferences of the central bank and
the volatility of the output gap. To the extent that a significant policy regime shift has occurred
at the beginning of the 1980s after the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman, it is likely
that the degree of asymmetry and therefore the degree of time-inconsistency has also changed
during the last four decades. Hence, rather than focusing on the full postwar period like Ireland
(1999) and Ruge-Murcia (2003), we study the sub-samples that are typically associated with a
shift in the conduct of US monetary policy according to the reasoning that the time-
inconsistency problem and the relative inflation bias are best interpreted as regime-specific. The
observed decline in the volatility of the output gap also seems consistent with this view.
This paper contributes to the literature on optimal monetary policy by measuring the
relative contribution of the inflation target and the asymmetric preferences induced inflation bias
to the rise and fall of postwar US inflation. Specifically, it is found that the inflation target is
3.42% and the average inflation bias is 1.01% during the pre-1979 policy regime while the
target declines to 1.96% and the bias vanishes over the last two decades. This result can be
rationalized by the fact that the policy preference on output stabilization appears to be large and
asymmetric before but not after the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman. Although
other factors such as a better policy making and more favorable supply shocks are also likely to
have played a role, this paper provides empirical support and quantitative measures of a new,
additional explanation for the behavior of US inflation.
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The behavior of postwar US in‡ation is characterized by two major episodes. The …rst is an
initial rise that extends from the 1960s through the early 1980s. The second is a subsequent
fall that lasts from the early 1980s to the present day. The important change that underlies
such a path can be exempli…ed by the average rates reported in the second column of Table 1.
In‡ation ismeasuredastheannualizedquarterlyincreaseinthelog GDP chain-typepriceindex
whereas theoutput gap is constructed as the log deviation of real GDP from theCongressional
Budget O¢ce potential output. The di¤erence of the average in‡ation rates across the two
sub-samples is above 2% and it is echoed by the decline in the volatility of the output gap
displayed in the third column.
While a more favorable macroeconomic environment during the second period, a better
policy management or a persistent error in the real-time measures of potential output are also
likely to have played a role, an important strand of theliterature has investigated whether the
time-consistency problem can explain the behavior of US in‡ation.
In a stimulating contribution, Ireland (1999) shows that Barro and Gordon’s (1983) model
oftime-consistentmonetarypolicy imposeslong-run restrictionson thetimeseriespropertiesof
in‡ation and unemployment thatarenotrejected bythedata. In theabsence ofacommitment
technology, the monetary authorities face an incentive to surprise in‡ation in an e¤ort to
achieve a lower level of unemployment through an expectations-augmented Phillips curve.
However, such an optimal plan is not time-consistent in the sense of Kydland and Prescott
(1977), and privateagents, whorationally understand such atemptation, adjust their decisions
accordingly. In equilibrium, unemploymentis still at its…rst-best level but therate ofin‡ation
is ine¢ciently higher than it would otherwise be. This is the celebrated in‡ation bias result,
according to which the higher the natural rate of unemployment the more severe the time-
consistency problem of monetary policy is.
As Persson and Tabellini (1999) make clear, the central bankers’ ambition of attaining a
level of unemployment below the natural rate is crucial to generate the kind of in‡ation bias
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an assumption on the ground of realism. McCallum (1997) argues that were this the case,
the monetary authorities would learn by practicingthe time-inconsistency of their actions and
eventually would revise their objective. Describing his experience as vice-Chairman, Blinder
(1998) claims that the Fed actually targets thenatural rate of real activity, thereby suggesting
that overambitious policy makers cannot be at the root of any kind of in‡ation bias. While
this may rationalize the failure of the theory to account for the short-run in‡ation dynamics
(see Ireland, 1999), it does not necessarily imply that the time-consistency problem has been
unimportant in the recent history of US monetary policy.
In an intriguing article, Ruge-Murcia (2003) constructs a model of asymmetric central
bank preferences that nests the Barro-Gordon model as a special case. When applied to the
full postwar period, the hypothesisthat theFed targetsalevel ofrealactivitydi¤erentfrom the
natural rate is rejected but the hypothesis that it weights more severely output contractions
than output expansions is not. This suggests the existence of a novel average in‡ation bias
that according to Cukierman (2002) comes from the private sector expectations of a more
vigorous policy response in recessions than in booms.
Speci…cally, the average in‡ation bias is a function of both the preferences of the central
bank and the volatility of the output gap. To the extent that a signi…cant policy regime
shift has occurred at the beginning of the 1980s after the appointment of Paul Volcker as
Fed Chairman, it is likely that the degree of asymmetry and therefore the degree of time-
inconsistency has also changed during the last four decades. Hence, rather than focusing on
the full postwar period like Ireland (1999) and Ruge-Murcia (2003), we study the sub-samples
that are typically associated with a shift in the conduct of US monetary policy according
to the reasoning that the time-inconsistency problem and the relative in‡ation bias are best
interpreted as regime-speci…c. The di¤erence in the sub-sample volatility of the output gap
shown in the third column of Table 1 also seems consistent with this view.
This paper contributes to the literature on optimal monetary policy by proposing a mea-
sure oftheaverage in‡ation biasthat arises in amodel ofasymmetric central bank preferences.
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parameters in the central bank objective function and, most importantly, to translate them
into a measure of time-inconsistency. The comparison between the commitment and the dis-
cretionary solutions shows how the observed in‡ation mean can be successfully decomposed
into a target and a bias argument, a result that to our knowledge of the existing literature
comes as new. Reduced-form estimates of US monetary policy rules indicate that a signi…cant
regime shift has occurred during the last forty years as measured by the change in the Fed
policy preferences. In particular, while the in‡ation target declines from 3:42% to 1:96%, the
average in‡ation bias, which is estimated at 1:01% before 1979, is found to disappear over the
last two decades. The result can be rationalized in terms of the policy preference on output
stabilization, which is found tobelarge and asymmetric in the pre- but not in thepost-Volcker
period.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and solves for the optimal
monetary policy. Section 3 derives its reduced-form version and reports the estimates of both
the feedback rule coe¢cients and the average in‡ation bias. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Following the literature, the private sector behavior is characterized by an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve:
yt =µ(¼t ¡¼e
t)+ut, µ >0 (1)
where yt is the output gap measured as the di¤erence between actual and potential output,
¼t denotes in‡ation and ¼e
t stands for the expectations on the in‡ation rate in period t from
the standpoint of period t¡1. The supply disturbance, ut, obeys a potentially autoregressive
process ut =½ut¡1 +"t where ½ 2 [0;1) and "t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance
¾2
". The private sector has rational expectations
¼e
t = Et¡1¼t (2)
with Et¡1 being the expectation conditional upon the information available at time t¡1.
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is normalized to zero. Moreover, yt is also a random variable as it depends on ut, and its
variance, which is a positive function of both ½ and ¾2
", is denoted by ¾2
y.
As customary in the literature, the central bank is assumed to have full and direct control







where ± is thediscountfactor and Lt stands for theperiod loss function. Thelatter is speci…ed











where ¸ >0 and ° represent therelative weight and the asymmetric preference on output sta-
bilization, respectively. The in‡ation target, ¼¤, is assumed stable enough to be approximated
by a positive constant that possibly di¤ers across sub-samples. Unlike in the Barro-Gordon
model, the target level of output is not meant to overambitiously exceed potential. This is
consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Ruge-Murcia (2003).
The objective function (4) tends to its minimum whenever both in‡ation and output gaps
shrink and larger losses are associated with larger absolute values at an increasing rate. The
linex speci…cation, which has been originally proposed by Varian (1974) and Zellner (1986)
in the context of Bayesian econometric analysis and introduced by Nobay and Peel (2003) in
the optimal monetary policy literature, allows departures from the quadratic objective in that
policy makers may treat di¤erently output contractions and output expansions. Indeed, under
an asymmetric loss function deviations of the same size but opposite sign yield di¤erent losses
and a negative value of ° implies that negative gaps are weighted more severely than positive
ones. To see this notice that whenever yt < 0 the exponential component of the loss function
dominatesthelinear componentwhiletheoppositeis true for yt >0. The reasoningis reversed
for positive values of °.
Thelinexspeci…cation neststhequadraticformasaspecialcaseand bymeansofL’Hôpital’s
rule it can be shown that whenever ° tends to zero the central bank objective function (4)








by Ruge-Murcia (2003), this feature is attractive as it allows us to test whether the relevant
preference parameter is statistically di¤erent from zero.1
Thespeci…cation of an asymmetricloss with respect totheoutput gap onlyis motivated by
empirical as well as theoretical considerations. At the empirical level, Surico (2003b) derives
a general, nonlinear interest rate rule within a model of nonquadratic preferences over both
in‡ation and output, and …nds evidence of an asymmetric objective for the latter but not for
the former variable. At the theoretical level, Geraats (1999) shows that the labor market ‡ows
over thebusinesscycleprovideanaturalmicrofoundation for anasymmetricwelfare criterion as
the …rms’ hiring-…ring decisions aremainly taken alongthe extensive margin duringrecessions
but along the intensive margin during booms.
2.1 Commitment
This subsection solvesfor theoptimal monetary policyunder commitment. Becausenoendoge-
nous state variable enters the model, the intertemporal policy problem reduces to a sequence
of static optimization problems. Accordingly, the monetary authorities, who can manipulate
in‡ation expectations, choose both planned in‡ation, ¼t, and expected in‡ation, ¼e
t, to mini-
mize the asymmetric loss function (4) subject to the augmented Phillips curve (1) and to the
additional constraint (2) imposed by the rational expectations hypothesis. The corresponding















with ¹ being the Lagrange multiplier associated to the rational expectation constraint. Com-
bining the optimality conditions to eliminate ¹, and taking expectations of the resulting ex-
1An alternative to the linex function is the cubic speci…cation proposed by Surico(2003a and 2003b). The
relative advantage of using the cubic form as the primitive function is that it does not require any approximation
of the optimal monetary policy rule. Nevertheless, for a realistic range of values of the in‡ation and the output
gaps, and given the estimates of ° reported below, the cubic and the linex function behave very similarly.
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E(¼t)= ¼¤ (6)
where wehaveused the lawofiterated expectations to getrid of Et¡1. Equation(6) statesthat
the planned in‡ation rate equals on average the socially desirable in‡ation rate and therefore
it is independent of the output gap.
2.2 Discretion
If commitment is infeasible, the monetary authorities choose the in‡ation rate ¼t at the be-
ginning of the period after the private agents have formed their expectations but before the








Itisinstructiveat thispoint tocomparethesolutionobtained under asymmetricpreferences
with the solution obtained under the standard quadratic case. Whenever ° tends to zero, it is
possible to show using L’Hôpital’s rule that the optimal monetary policy becomes
(¼t ¡¼¤) =¡¸µEt¡1 (yt) (8)
This implies that under quadratic preferences there exists a one to one mapping between the
in‡ation bias and the output gap conditional mean. Moreover, in the face of white noise
supply disturbances (i.e. ½ = 0) the in‡ation bias is zero re‡ecting the notion of potential
output targeting.
Turning back to equation (7), we notice that if the output gap is a zero mean, normally
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confronts directly the time-inconsistency of monetary policy. This amounts to take logs of





A comparison between the expected rates under commitment (6) and under discretion (10)
illustrates the source of a novel average in‡ation bias. The time-inconsistency of monetary
policy arises here because policy preferences are asymmetric rather than because the desired
level of output is above potential like in the Barro-Gordon model. As the private sector
correctlyanticipatesthemonetary authorities’ incentivetorespond moreaggressivelyto output
contractions than to output expansions (i.e. ° < 0), the in‡ation rate exceeds the …rst-best
solution attainable under commitment. Hence, policy makers end up generating a systematic
boost in in‡ation expectations, which is higher the larger and the more asymmetric the policy
preference on output stabilization is.
Possibleimprovementstothediscretionarysolutionwouldrequiretheappointmentofeither
a more conservative central banker, who is one endowed with a lower relative weight ¸ in the
spirit of Rogo¤(1985) and/or alower in‡ation target than society, or a more symmetric policy
maker, who is one endowed with a smaller absolute value of °. Lastly, the average in‡ation
bias is proportional to the variance of the output gap as the marginal bene…t of an in‡ation
surprise in (7) is convex in the output gap. When ° goes to zero as it does in equation (8),
such amarginal bene…t becomes linear and the average in‡ation bias disappears together with
the precautionary motive.
3 The evidence
This section investigates the empirical merits of the asymmetric preference model to account
for the behavior of postwar US in‡ation. The analysis spans the period 1960:1-2002:3 and
it is conducted on quarterly, seasonally adjusted data that have been obtained in February
2003 from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. In‡ation is measured as
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is constructed as the di¤erence between the log real GDP and the log real potential output
provided by the Congressional Budget O¢ce.
To make our results comparable with those reported by Ruge-Murcia (2003), we …rst con-
sider the whole sample. Then, we use our identi…cation strategy to estimate the asymmetric
preference and to obtain a measureof the in‡ation bias for both the pre- and the post-Volcker
regimes. We also address the issue of sub-sample stability by re-estimating the model over
Greenspan’s tenure, which begins in the third quarter of 1987. Indeed, equation (10) makes it
clear that the in‡ation biasis a function of policy makers’ preferencesand thereforeit can only
be interpreted as regime-speci…c. To the extent that a signi…cant break has occurred in the
conduct of US monetary policy during the last forty years, our identi…cation scheme provides
a sharper evaluation of the model by measuring the time-inconsistency across the two eras.
3.1 Preliminary analysis
As a way to provide a preliminary evidence before turning to the estimates of the nonlinear
optimalmonetarypolicy(7), we evaluatetheperformanceofthesymmetricquadraticparadigm
upon the behavior of the in‡ation bias that this speci…cation predicts. According to equation
(8), the conditional mean of the output gap is informative about the di¤erence between the
realized in‡ation and the in‡ation target. In particular, in the face of i.i.d. supply shocks
the conditional mean and therefore the in‡ation bias should be zero re‡ecting the notion of
quadratic preferences and potential output targeting.
Figure 1 displays the kernel estimates of the output gap conditional mean (with the sign
switched) over the full sample using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator, a second order Gaussian
kernel and the likelihood cross validation procedure to obtain a value for the …xed bandwidth
parameter. The results are una¤ected by using the least squares cross validation criterion
and an higher-order kernel. Before proceeding however it is important to stress what we are
not doing in this exercise. In particular, we are not using the output gap as the dependent
variable while estimating the optimality condition (8). Rather, we are computing from the
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which according to the model of quadratic preferences and potential output targeting is the
measure of the in‡ation bias at each point in time.
A number of interesting results emerge from Figure 1. First, the third quarter of 1982
appears to witness the beginning of a new era as represented by the intersection between the
lower bound of the 95% con…dence interval and the zero line. This is consistent with the
conventional wisdom that a regime-switch in the conduct of US monetary policy has occurred
at the beginning of the 1980s, especially with the end of the so-called ’Volcker experiment’ of
non-borrowed reserves targeting that Bernanke and Mihov (1998) date in 1982:3. Moreover,
the measure of the in‡ation bias is not statistically signi…cant only over the last two decades,
implyingthat the model of quadratic preferences and potential output targeting is rejected by
the data over the earlier regime. Although part ofthe di¤erence may be due to achangein the
persistence of the supply shocks, the output gap conditional mean and hencethe in‡ation bias
appears to be on average statistically di¤erent from zero during the …rst half of the sample.
This …nding proves inconsistent with a quadratic preference model and therefore calls for an
extension of the theory.
3.2 The reduced-form
The parameter ° and the exponential function in (7) govern the asymmetric response of the
policyratetopositiveand negativedeviations ofoutput from potential. Our taskis toestimate
a nonlinear reaction function in order to evaluate whether the asymmetric preference is sig-
ni…cantly di¤erent from zero. This amounts to test linearity against a nonlinear speci…cation,
which is complicated by the fact that it is not possible to recover all structural parameters of
the model from the reduced-form estimates. To overcome theissueand identifyboth ° and the
in‡ation bias, we take a simple transformation of the model. This involves the linearization of









+et = 0 (11)
with et being the remainder of the approximation.
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of the output gap conditional upon the information available at time t¡1. We solve equation
(11) for ¼t and prior to estimation we replace expected output gaps with actual values. The
empirical version of the feedback rule is given by:
¼t =¼¤ +®yt +¯y2
t +vt (12)
which is linear in the coe¢cients
®=¡¸µ and ¯ =¡
¸µ°
2













Under the null of quadratic preferences, the term in curly brackets is a linear combination of
forecast errors and therefore vt is orthogonal to any variable in the information set available
at time t¡1.
Equation (12) reveals that by assuming an optimizing central bank behavior the reaction
function parameters can only be interpreted as convolutions of the coe¢cients representing
policy makers’ preferences and those describing the structure of the economy. Nevertheless,
the reduced-form parameters allownow to recover both the asymmetricpreferences, ° =2¯=®,




To the extent that the penalty associated to an output contraction is larger than the penalty
associated to an output expansion of the same size, the model predicts ° < 0, ® < 0 (since
¸, µ > 0), and ¯ > 0. When coupled with the expectations-augmented Phillips curve (1),
this implies that the central bank faces an incentive to surprise in‡ation in an e¤ort to hedge
against the occurrence of an economic downturn. Put it di¤erently, the asymmetric preference
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relation between average in‡ation and the variance of the output gap.
The orthogonality conditions implied by the rational expectation hypothesis makes the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) a natural candidate to estimate equation (12). This
has also the advantage that no arbitrary restrictions need to be imposed on the information
set thatprivate agents usetoform expectations. Tocontrol for possible heteroskedasticityand
serial correlation in the error terms we use the optimal weighting scheme in Hansen (1982)
with a four lag Newey-West estimate of the covariance matrix. Three lags of in‡ation, output
gap and squared outputgap areused as instruments correspondingto a setof 7overidentifying
restrictions that can be tested for. The choice of a relatively small number of instruments is
meant to minimize the potential small sample bias that may arise when too many overidenti-
fying restrictions are imposed. We also check the robustness of our results to changes in the
instrument set. In particular, we re-estimate the model using…ve lagsofin‡ation and two lags
of output gap and squared output gap. The F-test applied to the …rst stageregressions, which
Staiger and Stock (1997) argue tobeimportantin evaluatingtherelevanceofthe instruments,
alwaysrejectsthenull ofweak correlation between the endogenous regressors and thevariables
in the instrument sets.
Table 2 reports the estimates of the feedback rule (12) for the full sample. Each row
corresponds to a di¤erent set of instruments. The parameter on the output gap, ®, is not sta-
tisticallydi¤erent from zerowhereasthe parameter on the squared output gap, ¯, is signi…cant
and positive. The estimates of the slope coe¢cients as well as the estimates of the in‡ation
target are robust to the instrument selection and the hypothesis of valid overidentifying re-
strictions is never rejected. These results are similar to those reported by Ruge-Murcia(2003)
as they con…rm the presence of asymmetric preference using a di¤erent method of estimation
and a di¤erent measure of real activity.
Table 3 reports the estimates for the pre- and post-Volcker regimes. We remove from the
second sub-sample the period 1979:3-1982:3 when the temporary switch in the Fed operating
proceduredocumented by Bernankeand Mihov (1998) appears toberesponsiblefor the failure
ECB • Working Paper No 291 • November 2003  17to gain control over in‡ation. The sample selection is also consistent with the nonparametric
evidence reported in the preliminary analysis.
The …rst two rows of Table 3 refer to the pre-Volcker era and show large negative values
for the level of the output gap besides to positive and signi…cant parameters for its squared.
The point estimates of the in‡ation target range from 3:42% to 3:69% while the asymmetric
preference parameter is negative and statistically signi…cant. These results sharply contrast
with the post-1979 values that are displayed in the middle rows and the bottom rows of Table
3. Indeed, not only the in‡ation target statistically declines to values around 2%, but also the
impact of the output gap level on in‡ation appears to be weaker, although still signi…cant. To
the extent that the structure of the economy has remained stable during the last forty years,
a smaller value of ® can only be rationalized by a decline in ¸, which corresponds to a more
conservative monetary policy stance. The most dramatic di¤erence between the two regimes
emerges however on the squared output gap, which actually loses explanatory power for both
set of instruments as well as for both post-1979 samples. This translates into values of the
policy parameter ° that are not statistically di¤erent from zero.
Turning to the measure of the asymmetric preference induced time-inconsistency, Table 4
reports the estimates of the average in‡ation bias. According to equation (10), the bias is
a convolution of the structural parameters of the model and the variance of the output gap.
Given the decline in the latter reported in the third column of Table 1, we expect also the
in‡ation bias todeclinemovingfrom the pre- tothepost-Volcker period. This seems consistent
with the change in the volatility ofthe supplyshocksdocumented by Hamilton (1996) between
the 1970s and the 1980s.
The second column of Table 4 shows the measure of the average in‡ation bias implied by
the reduced-form estimates of Table 3. The …rst block reports the pre-Volcker values whose
point estimates range from 1:01% in the baseline case to 1:36% for the alternative instrument
set. By contrast, the in‡ation bias is found to be not statistically di¤erent from zero over the
post-1979 era, re‡ecting thefact that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear
feedback rule during the former but not during the latter period. Empirical support for this
ECB • Working Paper No 291 • November 2003 18form of regime shift can also be found in the cross-country evidence over 22 OECD economies
reported by Cukierman and Gerlach (2003).
Lastly, the realized in‡ation mean over the pre-1979 sample falls in the range of estimates
implied by the sum of thein‡ation target and the in‡ation bias whileits post-Volcker counter-
parts appear tobehigher than themodel predicts. This suggests that thetheorycan e¤ectively
decomposethe observed in‡ation mean into a measure of the target and ameasure of the bias
over the pre-1979 regime, though it needs to be extended to account more fully for the gap
that appears in the data over the last two decades.
3.4 Robustness analysis
This subsection evaluates the robustness of our results to the empirical speci…cation of the
optimal monetary policy. An alternative to replacing expected values with realized values
prior to GMM estimation is to compute the conditional mean and the conditional variance of
the output gap, which according to the model of asymmetric preferences arehelpful topredict
in‡ation. To this end, we write the central bank’s best response function as follows:
¼t =c +aEt¡1 (yt)+b¾2
y;t +"t (13)
where ¾2
y;t stands for the output gap conditional variance. As shown by Ruge-Murcia (2003),
the reduced-form (13) does not make it possible to recover the relevant structural parameters,
though the estimates of c, a, and b are informative about the signi…cance and the sign of
the asymmetric preference °. In particular, a superior concern to output contractions relative
to output expansions implies a negative coe¢cient on the conditional mean and a positive
coe¢cient on the conditional variance.
The empirical analysis is complicated by thefact that neither the conditional mean nor the
conditionalvarianceoftheoutputgaparedirectlyobserved. Whilethekernelmethod described
above provides us with the estimates of the conditional mean, a model for the conditional
variance needs to be constructed. To address this issue, we usea GARCH (1,1) which appears
to e¤ectively capture the conditional heteroskedasticity in the US output gap. In so doing, we
introduce a direct link between the baseline (12) and the alternative (13) as the output gap,
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y;t, contributes also in
the latter speci…cation toforecast in‡ation nonlinearly. Although the conditional variance is a
generated regressor, the LM tests applied to the standardized squared residuals cannot reject
the null hypothesis of no misspeci…cation in the ARCH model (see Pagan and Ullah, 1988)
and therefore corroborate the choice of the parsimonious GARCH (1,1).
Table 5 reports the estimates of equation (13) over the three sub-samples using Two-stage
Least Square and a White’s correction for computing the standard errors. The use of an
IV estimator is dictated by the endogeneity problem that is implicit in the calculation of the
outputgap conditional mean. Theinstrumentsetincludes three lags ofin‡ation and three lags
ofthe explanatory variables. Theresultscon…rm, by and large,the estimatesobtained with the
baseline speci…cation. The parameters on the output gap conditional mean is always negative
and signi…cant whereas the positive coe¢cient on the conditional variance is signi…cant during
the pre-Volcker regimeonly. While this implies a negative value for the asymmetric preference
°, it reveals that US monetary policy can be e¤ectively described by a nonlinear policy rule
before but not after 1979.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a method to measure the time-inconsistency of monetary policy when
the preferences of the central bank are asymmetric. As demonstrated by Cukierman (2002),
if policy makers are more concerned about output contractions than output expansions, an
in‡ation bias can emerge on average even though the level of output is targeted at potential.
In addition, both casual observations and formal empirical analyses challenge the predictions
of the Barro-Gordon model by arguing that the Fed’s desired level of output does not exceed
the natural rate (see Blinder, 1998, and Ruge-Murcia, 2003).
Using a model of asymmetric preferences and potential output targeting, it is shown how
the observed in‡ation mean can be successfully decomposed into a targetand abias argument.
When applied topostwar US data, our identi…cation method indicates that the target is 3:42%
and the bias 1:01% during the pre-1979 policy regime. By contrast, over the last two decades
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result can be rationalized by the fact that the policy preference on output stabilization is
found to be large and asymmetric before but not after the appointment of Paul Volcker as
Fed Chairman. Although other factors such as a better policy making and more favorable
supply shocks are also likely to have played a role, this paper provides empirical support and
quantitative measures of a new, additional explanation for the behavior of US in‡ation during
the postwar period.
While suggestive, the results reported in this paper are based on a simple model, and the
speci…cation of a richer structure of the economy is likely to produce also a state-contingent
bias as well as a stabilization bias. However, as shown by Svensson (1997) and Cukierman
(2002), the average in‡ation bias would then belarger than it is with a standard expectations-
augmented Phillips curve. This suggests not only that our estimates are better interpreted as
a lower bound but also that a richer speci…cation of the private agents’ behavior may account
for the gap between the model-based average in‡ation and the actual average in‡ation during
the last two decades. Given our limited knowledge of the channel(s) through which the time-
consistency problem a¤ects policy outcomes, measuring and disentangling the in‡ation bias
remains a challenging topic for future research.
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Sample
Inflation mean Output gap standard
deviation
1960 – 2002 3.78 2.61
1960 – 1982 4.87 3.03
1983 - 2002 2.51 1.98
US quarterly data. Inflation is measured as changes in the GDP chain-
type price index and output gap is obtained from the CBO.
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- full sample -
Instruments



















Specification:  t t t t v y y + + + =
2 * b a p p
Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in
brackets. Inflation is measured as changes in the GDP chain-type price index and
output gap is obtained from the CBO. The instrument set (1) includes a constant,
three lags of inflation, output gap and squared output gap. The instrument set (2)
includes a constant, five lags of inflation, and two lags of output gap and squared
output gap. F-stat refers to the statistics of the hypothesis testing for weak
instruments relative to output gap and squared output gap, respectively. J(m) refers
to the statistics of Hansen’s test for  m overidentifying restrictions which is
distributed as a c
2(m) under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions.
The superscript ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true
coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
ECB • Working Paper No 291 • November 2003  25Table 3: Reaction Function and Policy Preference Estimates
- sub samples -
Instruments

































































Specification:  t t t t v y y + + + =
2 * b a p p
Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in brackets.
Inflation is measured as changes in the GDP chain-type price index and output gap is obtained
from the CBO. The instrument set (1) includes a constant, three lags of inflation, output gap and
squared output gap. The instrument set (2) includes a constant, five lags of inflation, and two
lags of output gap and squared output gap. F-stat refers to the statistics of the hypothesis testing
for weak instruments relative to output gap and squared output gap, respectively. J(m) refers to
the statistics of Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a c
2(m)
under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote
the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and 10
percent significance levels, respectively.



























































Standard errors in parenthesis. The instrument set (1) includes a constant, three lags of
inflation, output gap and squared output gap. The instrument set (2) includes a constant, five
lags of inflation, and two lags of output gap and squared output gap. The superscript ** and
* denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent
and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. The inflation bias is computed as 
2
y bs .
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- alternative estimates of the output gap process -
c a b




























Specification:  ( ) t t y t t t b y aE c e s p + + + = -
2
, 1
Two-stage Least Squares. Standard errors using White’s correction are reported in brackets.
Inflation is measured as changes in the GDP chain-type price index, the CBO output gap
conditional mean is obtained using the kernel method explained above and the conditional
variance of the CBO output gap is estimated through a GARCH(1,1) specification. The
instruments set includes a constant, three lags of inflation and three lags of the explanatory
variables. F-stat refers to the statistics of the hypothesis testing for weak instruments relative to
the output gap conditional mean and conditional variance, respectively. The superscript ** and
* denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 5 percent and
10 percent significance levels, respectively.
ECB • Working Paper No 291 • November 2003 28Figure 1: The Evolution of the Inflation Bias over Time
Sample: 1960:1 – 2002:3, US quarterly data. Inflation is measured as changes in
the GDP chain-type price index and output gap is obtained from the CBO. The
kernel estimates of the output gap conditional mean on inflation are obtained
using the Nadaraya-Watson method, a second order Gaussian kernel and the
likelihood cross validation procedure to get a value for the fixed bandwidth
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